Table 4: The effect of a small positive price

	Y = Frequency of outpatient visits		
	Extensive margin	Intensive margin	
	Pr(Y≥1)	Pr(Y≥2)	Pr(Y≥3)
By health status			
Healthy			
2 USD/visit	-0.051***	-0.028***	-0.014**
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Mean	0.305	0.121	0.050
% change from mean	*-16.7%*	*-23.1%*	*-27.9%*
Sick			
2 USD /visit	-0.014	-0.038**	-0.020*
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.011)
Mean at C=0	0.569	0.311	0.163
% change from mean	*-2.5%*	*-12.2%*	*-12.3%*

Notes: The estimates β^C (C= 2 USD/visit) from equation [3] are reported. We construct the health status in the following way: we first calculate the total spending at the first 6 months of observations for each individual whose subsidy status does not change during this period, and then divide each individual into three groups (lowest spending corresponds to healthy, and highest spending corresponds to sick) within each cell: (age in years)×(with or without subsidy). We omit the middle type. All the regressions include age (in months) FE, time (in month) FE, and individual FE. We also control for an in-kind dummy that takes one if the municipality offers the subsidy in the form of in-kind instead of refund, and an income restriction dummy that takes one if the municipality imposes income restriction for subsidy eligibility. The observations within 2 months from the price changes are excluded from the sample to account for anticipatory utilization. The mean is the average of the control group (C= 0%). Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table 5: Appropriate versus Inappropriate Use of Antibiotics

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Tier1	Tier2	Tier3
2 USD/visit	0.001	-0.066	-0.096**
	(0.040)	(0.085)	(0.043)
R-squared	0.07	0.13	0.08
N	2,992,982	2,992,982	2,992,982
N of Individual	90,257	90,257	90,257
Mean at C=0	0.382	1.311	0.523
% change from mean	*0.3%*	*-5.0%*	*-18.3%*

Notes: The estimates β^C (C= 2 USD/visit) from equation [1] are reported. The outcome is monthly outpatient spending on antibiotics for patients in each tier measured in USD (100JPY/USD). See Appendix Table E-1 for the list of diagnosis in each tier along with the corresponding ICD10. All the regressions include age (in months) FE, time (in month) FE, and individual FE. We also control for an in-kind dummy that takes one if the municipality offers the subsidy in the form of in-kind instead of refund, and an income restriction dummy that takes one if the municipality imposes restriction for subsidy eligibility. The observations within 2 months from the price changes are excluded from the sample to account for anticipatory utilization. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

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日本共産党　宮本徹